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This article shows how indicators of agents’ inflation expectations can be derived from the 
prices of various financial instruments and presents the estimates obtained for the euro area 
and the United States. The results show that these metrics have reacted to economic and 
monetary decisions made in recent years, and that, on average, expected inflation is lower 
and less volatile in the euro area than in the United States. 
Moreover, since end-2016 there has been a marked rise in the probability of observing long-
term inflation rates above 2% in the United States, coinciding with the likely change in the 
country’s economic policy stance. Changes in the indicators for the euro area have been less 
pronounced over this period, although a marked drop in the probability of low or negative 
inflation rates has been observed.
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Agents’ inflation expectations are decisive when studying changes in many of the variables 
shaping households’ and firms’ decision-making. As well as the average value of 
expectations, the probability agents assign to extreme inflation scenarios is also significant 
(such scenarios might include extremely high or negative inflation rates), given the impact 
these expectations have on the economy’s growth and stability. In this connection, there 
are therefore various approaches to measuring agents’ expectations. One approach is 
based on the consensus view of specialist economic forecasters, such as the surveys of 
professional forecasters by the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, both of which are released quarterly. Other surveys also exist, such as the 
University of Michigan Survey of Consumers in the United States, which elicits information 
from consumers rather than professional forecasters, and is produced monthly. These 
surveys have the drawback that they are released relatively infrequently and the information 
is received with something of a time lag. Moreover, they only cover a small range of time 
horizons (one, three and five years) and, as identified in the literature [Ang et al. (2007); 
Chan et al. (2013)], there is bias and inertia in the responses.
An alternative way of obtaining agents’ inflation expectations is to use the prices of market-
traded financial instruments employed to hedge against inflation. One advantage of this 
approach is that, as well as the mean distribution of expectations, it is possible to derive 
the whole probability function. This makes it possible to estimate the probability of the 
occurrence of certain extreme events or the uncertainty of future inflation, for example. 
Another additional advantage in comparison with surveys is that changes in expectations 
can be observed almost in real time. This makes it easier to identify the effect of specific 
events or decisions on inflation expectations.
Chart 1 compares the expectations produced by a survey of analysts with those obtained 
from inflation swaps in each of the two areas over various intervals.1 As can be seen, over 
the short term they both give very similar signals, particularly in Europe, whereas over the 
longer term, there is less dispersion in the information from surveys, as they react more 
moderately to factors such as fluctuations in commodity prices or shifts in monetary or 
fiscal policy. Thus, for example, the inflation expectations obtained from swaps in the 
United States rose considerably in the wake of the recent presidential elections, although 
this did not show up in the survey data.
These divergences between the surveys and inflation swaps over the longer term are at 
least partly due to the fact that the latter have different risk premia, which are included in 
the prices of the underlying financial assets and which may also vary over time. The 
presence of these premia may distort the information content of these indicators as a 
measure of agents’ inflation expectations.
Following this introduction, this article comprises two further sections. The first describes 
the financial instruments from which information about inflation expectations can be 
Introduction
1 Using the methodology explained in the following sections
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derived, and the second presents the results of applying a methodology enabling derivation 
of a risk-neutral probability function of agents’ inflationary expectations to data for the 
euro area and the United States.
One of the most popular metrics of inflation expectations (breakeven inflation rates) based 
on financial asset prices is that obtained from inflation-linked bonds. This metric is calculated 
by comparing the yield of a conventional bond (whose associated coupon and principal 
payments are fixed in nominal terms) with that of an inflation-linked bond (indexed to a 
price index) of the same maturity from the same issuer.
The inflation-linked bond market is particularly active in the United States, where these 
assets (known as Treasury inflation-protected securities or TIPS) are issued in sufficient 
quantity to create a liquid market in which price formation is fluid. By contrast, the situation 
in Europe is characterised by fragmentation due to the existence of multiple issuers 
(namely the treasuries of France, Italy and Germany, which are traditional issuers, and 
Greece, a less frequent issuer, which were joined by Spain in 2014) and the use of different 
consumer price indices (national and European) as their reference, which reduces liquidity 
Financial instruments with 
information about inflation 
expectations
INFLATION-LINKED BONDS
SOURCES: Banco de España, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and Consensus Forecast.
a Inflation expectations calculated using market data comprise the compensation demanded by investors for increases in the price level obtained from daily swap 
data for the US and euro area, using the methodology of Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017).
b The sources of the inflation expectations based on survey data are the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in the US (released quarterly) and the Consensus 
Forecast for the euro area (short-term forecast released monthly, long-term forecast six-monthly). Survey data refer to year-end, whereas swap data refer to 9- 
month inflation, such that the horizon is the same in April of each year [see Gimeno and Ortega, (2016)].
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and is an obstacle to obtaining a clear signal on the compensation demanded by investors 
for the expected increases in the cost of living.
An additional problem with this indicator is that it includes other components as well as 
investors’ expectations about future price developments. Firstly, to the extent that investors 
are averse to inflation risk, they will demand a premium on conventional bonds that 
compensates them for the risk incurred, but not on inflation-linked bonds, as they are 
protected against this risk. For this reason, the indicator does not strictly measure the level 
of expectations, but the compensation for inflation investors demand. Secondly, the 
different level of liquidity of the two instruments used to obtain the indicator (generally 
higher for conventional bonds than inflation-linked ones), means the yield spread between 
them is also influenced by their different liquidity premiums. Table 1 summarises these 
components for each bond type, and for the inflation compensation indicator. As well as the 
inflation-related factors mentioned, conventional bonds include a component reflecting the 
expected future course of the real interest rate, together with its associated risk premium. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the size of the premia present in the break-even rate 
(inflation risk and relative liquidity) may change over time, depending on changes in 
investors’ risk appetite, the level of inflation risk, or market liquidity conditions.
The inflation compensation metric derived from inflation-linked bonds may be temporarily 
affected by other factors additional to those mentioned. Thus, for instance, changes in the 
supply and demand for conventional bonds relative to that for inflation-linked bonds, such 
as those associated with quantitative easing programmes,2 for example, may cause 
distortions in these indicators. Given all these drawbacks, an extensive academic literature 
has developed seeking to isolate the various different components of the inflation 
expectation indicators obtained from inflation-linked bonds.3
Along with inflation-linked bonds, inflation-linked swaps (ILS) are another type of financial 
asset containing information about agents’ inflation expectations. In this derivative 
instrument, one of the contracting parties undertakes to pay the other a fixed sum on a 
future date in exchange for a payment linked to the future level of a price index. For example, 
in the case of a one-year ILS, the fixed-rate party could agree to pay 2% of €1 million in 
consideration for receiving the fraction of this nominal €1 million equivalent to the increase 
INFLATION-LINKED SWAPS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Conventional bond factors  Inflation-linked bond factors  Inflation compensation factors
Real interest rate expectations Real interest rate expectations
Real interest rate risk premium Real interest rate risk premium
Inflation expectations Inflation expectations
Inflation risk premium Inflation risk premium
Nominal bond liquidity premium Inflation-linked bond liquidity premium Liquidity premium spread
TABLE 1FACTORS INCLUDED IN BOND PRICES
2  Only conventional government bonds were purchased in the Federal Reserve Board’s first quantitative easing 
programme. During the Federal Reserve Board’s second quantitative easing programme (QE II), a total of $600 billion-
worth of government securities was purchased, of which $26 billion was in the form of inflation-linked bonds. The 
fact that more conventional bonds are being bought than inflation-linked bonds could push down their relative yield, 
and therefore depress the inflation expectations indicator in a way that is due to a mismatch in the supply and 
demand for bonds used to calculate the indicator rather than to agents’ forecasts of future consumer price trends.
3  See, for example, D’Amico et al. (2014) and Chernov and Mueller (2012).
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in the CPI over this twelve-month period. Contrary to the case of inflation-linked bonds, the 
ILS market is more liquid in Europe than in the United States [Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017)].
ILSs are bilaterally negotiated private contracts with no intermediary clearing house. This 
can create the risk of the other party failing to meet its commitment at the end of the 
period, such that the negotiated price incorporates the corresponding premium. 
Nevertheless, the absence of cash transfers until maturity reduces the size of this premium, 
as well as the liquidity premium, as there is no opportunity cost relative to alternative 
investments [Fleming and Sporn (2013)].4
Like inflation-linked bonds, inflation swaps contain an inflation risk premium. They therefore 
measure compensation for inflation as well as inflation expectations. One of the main 
advantages of the ILS-based indicator relative to that obtained from inflation-linked bonds 
is that, as it is not necessary to compare two different bonds, the distortions caused by ad 
hoc factors that can affect the markets asymmetrically are eliminated. In particular, these 
indicators would not have been directly affected by distortions linked to the implementation 
of central banks’ asset purchase programmes.
Inflation options are contracts in which one of the parties undertakes to pay the other an 
amount depending on whether a price index exceeds (cap) or falls below (floor) a given 
threshold (the strike rate) within a given period. If the condition is met, the payment would 
be the difference, in absolute terms, between the index and the threshold. Unlike both 
inflation-linked bonds and ILSs, which give estimates of the averages only at specific 
points in time, options can be used to obtain additional information such as the full 
probability distribution of the future course of inflation or implied volatility. This gives 
information about risk and uncertainty around the expected average value. In particular, an 
increase in the implied volatility suggests that agents are more concerned and/or there is 
more uncertainty over the future course of price indices.
As in the case of ILSs, options are negotiated bilaterally without the intermediation of a 
clearing house, such that prices may include a counterparty risk premium. The majority of 
these derivatives are negotiated using the harmonised euro area CPI, the UK RPI (Retail Price 
Index) or the US CPI (Consumer Price Index), with expiries ranging from one to thirty years. 
The most liquid market is linked to the euro area index, followed by that of the UK [see Smith 
(2012)]. It should also be noted that, as in the case of the financial instruments discussed 
earlier, option prices also contain premiums for inflation risk, and potentially, liquidity risk.
Table 2 summarises the main differences between the inflation expectation indicators based 
on inflation-linked bonds, swaps and inflation-linked options. First of all, the inflation risk 
premium is present in all three indicators and the amount is the same. For its part, the liquidity 
risk premium is negative in the case of the bond-based metric, as conventional bonds are 
more liquid than interest-linked bonds, whereas in the ILS the sign of this premium is positive. 
The counterparty risk premium is only present in the case of ILSs and inflation options. Finally, 
the estimation error could be more significant in the case of the indicator based on inflation-
linked bonds.5
INFLATION OPTIONS
4  https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2013/0513flem.pdf
5  Unlike ILSs, where the compensation for inflation is directly observable from the price, the bond-based indicator 
requires a comparison of the yields on inflation-linked bonds and conventional bonds. The differences in the 
features of both types of bonds, beyond the fact that in the case of inflation-linked bonds payments are linked 
to inflation (such as, for example, their expiry) may distort the inflation expectations indicator. The indicator is 
also seasonal, in a way that is linked to the behaviour of inflation. To correct for these distortions, models or 
adjustments are often used that are subject to potential estimation errors.
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This section presents the results of estimating probability distributions for the euro area 
and the United States using the methodology proposed by Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017). 
Specifically, whereas in the literature the distribution is usually estimated for each expiry 
independently,6 here a single model is estimated for all the available time frames, using 
sufficiently liquid ILSs and options to do so. The main advantage of this approach is that 
calibrating a joint model reduces the risk of overparameterisation and that it is also even 
possible to derive values for horizons over which no instruments are traded, such as five-
year inflation in five years’ time (5-year/5-year inflation).7 In the first stage, Gimeno and 
Ibáñez (2017) extract the average from the ILSs and then calculate the remainder of the 
parameters of the probability distribution using options. This reduces the sensitivity of the 
estimates to possible shortcomings in the data quality.8
Chart 2 plots average compensation for inflation over the medium term since 2010 
(2-year/2-year forward inflation rates) and long term (5-year/5-year forward inflation rates) 
for the euro area and the United States. The first conclusion that emerges is that despite 
the differences in the phase of the economic cycle in each of the areas, the paths of 
compensation for expected price rises have been similar in both economies. In particular, 
a downward trend has been observed since 2013, with occasionally increments, which 
reversed in the second half of 2016, coinciding, inter alia, with a sharp rise in the oil price 
and heightened expectations of a change in economic policy stance in the United States. 
By contrast, the trend so far in 2017 has been relatively stable. It is also noteworthy that 
the indicator for Europe was systematically below that for the United States, where the 
economic cycle is further advanced than in the euro area.
First of all, the indicator obtained makes it possible to study whether the expected value 
of the compensation for inflation is wide of the price stability target set by the monetary 
authorities.9 Looking at the 5-year/5-year time scale, which is the longer term here, in the 
US case compensation for inflation has remained above 2% throughout almost the entire 
analysis period. However, in the euro area this indicator was below 2% from 2015 onwards, 
deviating from this target in 2016 in particular. Looking at the 2-year/2-year time scale, in 
the euro area the expected value of compensation for inflation has been below the price 
Empirical results: euro 
area vs. the United States
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Inflation-linked bonds vs. inflation swaps and options
Inflation risk premium Same
Liquidity risk premium Potentially higher in the case of inflation-linked bonds. The sign is positive for swaps and negative for bonds
b dCounterparty risk premium Only in the case of inflation swaps and options
Estimation error Estimation is more complex in the case of inflation-linked bonds as seasonal adjustment calculations are 
required and not all the characteristics of the nominal bonds with which they are compared are identical 
to those of inflation-linked bonds (particularly as regards maturities)
TABLE 2DIFFERENCES IN INFLATION EXPECTATION INDICATORS BASED ON INFLATION-LINKED BONDS 
AND THOSE BASED ON INFLATION SWAPS AND OPTIONS
6  See, for example, Smith (2012); Kitsul and Wright (2013); Scharnagl and Stapf (2015); or Fleckenstein et al. (2017).
7  Five-year inflation expectations in five years’ time are one of the main inflation expectation metrics used both by 
the ECB [Draghi (2014)] and the monetary authorities in other areas.
8  The information on inflation options is incomplete, there being various expiries and strike prices for which no data 
are available.
9  Although since its inception the ECB has had an inflation target of below, but close to, 2%, the Federal Reserve 
Board did not adopt the 2% target until January 2012. Moreover, it is worth noting that the Federal Reserve 
Board has a dual monetary policy mandate, whereby it targets both price stability and full employment.
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stability target throughout almost the entire period, registering levels below 1.5% since 
2014. In the United States, however, the 2% level was exceeded most of the time, although 
it was slightly lower from 2015 until end-2016.
Chart 2 also shows how these indicators have reacted to certain monetary policy 
decisions, the effects being somewhat more pronounced in the case of medium-term 
inflation compensation than over longer horizons. Thus, for example, in the case of the 
United States, the announcement in September 2011 by the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) of an “operation twist” (Maturity Extension Program, MEP)10 significantly raised the 
compensation for inflation and reversed the sharp downward trend of previous months. 
Specifically, the expected value of the compensation for 2-year/2-year inflation rose by 
0.5 pp between the time the programme was announced and the end of its implementation, 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Estimates obtained using daily inflation swap and option data for the United States and the euro area, using the methodology of Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017).
b Inflation targets are 2% for the euro area and the United States (since January 2012).
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10  The aim of the programme was to extend the maturity of the Federal government debt portfolio, by replacing 
$400 billion of securities with residual maturities of less than three years by securities with residual maturities 
of between six and thirty years.
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whereas the expected value for 5-year/5-year inflation rose by 0.25 pp. The operation twist 
aimed to lower long-term interest rates without altering the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet in the context of the uncertainty caused by the government debt ceiling crisis in the 
United States, successive bouts of heightened tension in international financial markets 
(euro area sovereign debt crisis), and the weakness of the recovery. The announcement of 
the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) in the euro area in early 2015, which aimed 
to curb the drop in inflationary expectations also seems to have managed to raise the 
compensation for inflation, reversing the trend observed in 2014. Thus, following the 
announcement of this programme on 22 January 2014, compensation for 2-year/2-year 
inflation had risen by 0.2 pp and that for 5-year/5-year by just 0.03 pp by the end of June.
Chart 3 plots the estimated implied volatility, which gives information about market 
participants’ level of concern or uncertainty about future inflation. Broadly, a downward 
trend can be seen in both areas over the period analysed. It is worth noting the upturn in 
volatility in the United States in the last four months of 2010, which seemed to respond to 
the prevailing uncertainty about the future course of monetary policy and its effects on the 
level of inflation. Thus, the Federal Reserve Board announced in August 2010 the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Estimates obtained using daily inflation swap and option data for the United States and euro area using the methodology of Gimeno and Ibañez (2017).
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reinvestment on maturity of bonds issued by the US Treasury and government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) in new federal government 
bonds (without altering the balance sheet). Moreover, in November that year, in the face of 
the deflation risks and sluggish economic recovery, it launched a fresh round of $600 
billion-worth of asset purchases.
However, not all monetary policy decisions have affected volatility or the expected value 
of compensation for inflation equally. Thus, for example, the Federal Reserve Board’s 
announcement in May 2013 that it might start tapering the volume of Treasury bond 
purchases as a result of improving labour market conditions did not significantly affect 
inflation compensation metrics. In this case, the rise in yields on conventional bonds 
following the announcement was linked more to the real interest rate expectations 
component and the forward premium than inflation-related factors. Another clear episode 
of uncertainty about future inflation occurred during last year’s presidential elections in the 
United States, resulting in a sharp upturn in implicit volatility in late 2016. This was not 
seen in the euro area, and could have been a reflection of the market’s doubts about the 
implementation and impacts of the new administration’s economic policy package 
(financial deregulation, trade protectionism and fiscal expansion).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Estimates obtained from daily inflation swap and option data for the United States and the euro area using the methodology of Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017).
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These estimates can also be used to derive the probability that the inflation rate will lie 
within a given interval. Thus, for instance, it is possible to calculate the probability that 
inflation will be below zero, providing a signal of the deflation risk. Moreover, the probability 
of price growth being above a certain threshold indicates the extent to which the monetary 
policy price stability target may be exceeded.
Chart 4 plots the probabilities of negative inflation in each of the two geographical areas 
studied over the alternative horizons analysed earlier. In the case of 2-year/2-year inflation 
a sharp rise was seen in the euro area between mid-2014 and July 2016, with a short-lived 
interruption in the first half of 2015 when the ECB announced the extension of its asset 
purchase programme. This pattern occurred at a time when inflation in the euro was 
extremely low, indeed at negative levels in some months during the period. This situation 
began to be reversed in July 2016 as oil prices rose. As might be expected, variations in 
the probabilities over longer horizons are more moderate in both the euro area and the 
United States. In the euro area, the probability of negative inflation over the 2-year/2-year 
horizon was 8.4% in June 2017, whereas over the 5-year/5-year horizon it was 1%, with 
negligible risk of a potential long-term price drop. The pattern was similar in the United 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Estimates obtained from daily inflation swap and option data for the United States and the euro area using the methodology of Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017).
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States over the two-year horizon, but the changes are more pronounced and the level 
lower, which could be interpreted as a sign that markets are more concerned about a 
negative inflation scenario in the euro area than in the United States, although these fears 
have largely dissipated over the last few months.
Chart 5 plots the risk-neutral probabilities of inflation below 4% over the two horizons 
examined. These probabilities are lower in the euro area than in the United States, and 
have steadily declined to levels close to zero in the most recent period. The trend in the 
United States has also been downwards since 2013, although this reversed after the 
presidential elections, a change that was subsequently corrected somewhat for the two-
year horizon. The recent upturn in the US economy would suggest that markets are 
somewhat more concerned about high inflation scenarios over the long term.
Lastly, Charts 6.1 and 6.2 plot the estimates of the risk-neutral density function in both 
geographical areas and for both horizons analysed up to end-June 2017. The comparison 
between them shows that for the longer horizon (5-year/5-year) the higher probabilities in 
the euro area are concentrated in the 1%-2% range, whereas the United States has higher 
values than in Europe for levels of inflation of over 3%. The distributions over the medium 
term (2-year/2-year) resemble one another more closely, although the US distribution is 
SOURCES: Banco de España.
a Estimates obtained from daily inflation swap and option data for the United States and the euro area using the methodology of Gimeno and Ibáñez (2017).
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shifted to the right relative to that of the euro area. This suggests that over this horizon the 
market foresees higher inflation rates in the United States. The probability of negative 
inflation is higher in the euro area, despite the significant moderation of this probability in 
the most recent period.
The Chart 6.3 shows how the recent US presidential elections have substantially changed 
the estimates of the long-term probability histogram for the US economy, going from a 
distribution with small tails centred on 2% in early September to one with bigger tails 
centred on values above 2% subsequently. This indicates that the uncertainty over future 
inflation, and the compensation demanded for longer maturities, has increased. During 
this same period, changes in the long-term density function estimated for the euro area 
have been more moderate (see Chart 6.4), the drop in the probability mass for low and 
negative values of inflation standing out, which suggests the markets are less concerned 
about these scenarios materialising.
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